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Abstract
We study asset prices and portfolio choice with overlapping generations, where the young
disregard history to learn from own experience. Disregarding history implies less precise
estimates of output growth, which in equilibrium leads the young to increase their investment
in risky assets after positive returns, that is, they act as trend chasers. In equilibrium, the
risk premium decreases after a positive shock and, therefore, trend chasing young agents
lose wealth relative to old agents who behave as contrarians. Consistent with findings from
survey data, the average belief about the risk premium in the economy relates negatively to
future excess returns and is smoother than the true risk premium.
Keywords: Learning from Experience Based Bias, Trend Chasing, Survey Based versus
Objective Risk Premiums
JEL Classification: E2, G10, G11, G12
1 Introduction
Any risky investment decision, for example an investment in the stock market, requires the
formation of expectations about fundamentals such as dividends and discount rates. Most
models of financial decision making assume that investors form these expectations in an
unbiased way. Yet, there are ongoing debates among academics and practitioners about
the extent and nature of predictability in stock market returns and, more generally, about
the level of the risk premium. Since academics and practitioners struggle to find common
ground, it appears to be challenging to form the unbiased expectations required for optimal
investment decisions.
Looking at survey data substantiates the concern that many economic agents fail to form
unbiased expectations. According to the surveys, agents extrapolate stock returns, that is,
when they see a high (low) return they expect to see more of it. However, this is contrary
to what we see in the data and, therefore, forecasts of expected stock market returns are
typically negatively correlated with actual future returns and ex ante measures of the risk
premium.1 This poses a serious challenge not just for models of financial decision making but
for standard models of asset markets, in which agents perfectly understand the time-variation
in stock market returns.
Given the complexity involved in producing economic forecasts, it seems that the question
is not whether expectations or forecasts are biased but rather which are the decisive biases.
Our focus is on how lifetime experiences affect expectations. For instance, stark experiences
early on in life such as the Great Depression might drive the expectations of agents way
beyond the end of the Great Depression. One would, however, expect that the bias declines
over time as investors observe year after year that the Great Depression did not reoccur. Such
behavior could be consistent with empirical evidence in support of the idea that experience
matters for the formation of beliefs.2 If this is the case, then personal experiences with stock
1See Greenwood and Shleifer (2014).
2See Malmendier and Nagel (2016).
markets and the macroeconomy in general should manifest through savings and investment
decisions and impact asset prices.
In this paper, we depart from standard models of asset markets that assume that every
investor knows the underlying dynamics of fundamentals to instead allow investors to form
expectations that are influenced by their own lifetime experiences. The learning from expe-
rience based bias generates a life-cycle of expectations about the risk premium that ranges
from return extrapolation when young to contrarian when old. Contrary to the beliefs of the
young, from the point of view of an econometrician with full information, the risk premium
decreases after positive shocks. Hence, young agents increase their risky investment at times
when the risk premium is low, leading to a slower wealth accumulation in the early years of
life. Our model is sufficiently rich to accommodate a cross-section of beliefs that is consistent
with findings from survey evidence such as the return extrapolation of the average investor
and the negative correlation between the consensus forecast and future stock market returns.
Specifically, we consider an overlapping generations economy with incomplete information
about expected growth in aggregate output. In the economy, agents learn about the true
expected growth using Bayes' rule, but they only use the data observed during their own
lifetime. Hence, agents overweight their own lifetime experiences relative to history, i.e., they
exhibit a learning from experience based bias. Therefore, young agents with little experience
on average make large mistakes and update their beliefs more aggressively in response to
news than older agents with ample experience.
Since agents are learning from their own experience, beliefs about growth differ across
all generations of agents. Consequently, the entire cross-section of beliefs in the economy
determines asset prices, where the beliefs of wealthy agents have larger impact than that
of poor agents. Thus, the market view, which we define as the wealth weighted average
expectation of growth, instead of the true expected growth rate, serves as the relevant
statistic for asset pricing. As a result, the market view drives the interest rate and in times
of an elevated market view, we see high interest rates due to the intertemporal smoothing
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motive. In addition, from the perspective of an econometrician equipped with complete
information about the true expected growth, the risk premium seems low in times of an
elevated market view.
So how does the market view fluctuate over time? In our economy, all agents revise their
expectations upwards in response to a positive shock. Consequently, the market view in-
creases, which, in turn, pushes the interest rate up and the risk premium down. Importantly,
changes in the market view in response to a shock are not only due to changes in the beliefs
of individual agents, but also because the wealth distribution puts more weight on agents
that have beliefs that happen to be more consistent with the direction of the shock. To
understand this, consider again a positive shock, where all agents revise their expectations
upwards, which increases the market view. Now, as the market view is the wealth weighted
average belief and agents trade on their beliefs, a positive shock increases the wealth of the
optimists relative to the pessimists and, therefore, it increases the market view beyond the
change due to heightened expectations. Thus, there is an overreaction in the market view.
We show that the effect coming from wealth reallocations is particularly large when dis-
agreement is high and wealth is more evenly distributed among agents with differing beliefs.
After large wealth reallocations, the market view is likely to revert back to the true mean at
a faster rate than at other times because speculative trade is at a high, implying that agents
with too optimistic or too pessimistic beliefs are likely to lose out to experienced traders.
Although the market view determines prices, all generations of agents perceive the risk
premium differently. Expanding on this point, we show that while the true risk premium
depends on the difference between the actual expected growth and the market view, the
perceived risk premium depends on the difference between the individual agent's belief about
growth and the market view. Hence, agents who are relatively optimistic perceive a high
risk premium on the stock market since from their point of view the stock appears to be
cheap, or, put differently the discount rate seems to be high.
Next, we turn to the dynamics of the perceived risk premium by relating it to the true
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risk premium. Specifically, the covariance between the true risk premium and the perceived
risk premium depends on the variance of the market view minus the covariance between
the market view and the individual agent's belief about growth. Young agents with little
experience update their beliefs much more aggressively in response to news than older more
experienced agents and the covariance between the market view and their belief is higher
than the volatility of the market view. Consequently, the belief about the risk premium of
agents with little experience correlates negatively with the true risk premium. Instead of
perceiving a low risk premium after positive shocks, the young perceive a high risk premium
and respond by increasing their investment in the stock market. The behavior of the young
mimics return extrapolation. Older agents with more experience act as contrarians.
We see that the old counter-balance the demand of the young and, thereby, the market
clears since in equilibrium there has to be contrarians to facilitate trade based on return
extrapolation.
In the model, the average belief about the risk premium correlates positively with past
returns and negatively with the true risk premium. Therefore, an econometrician studying a
representative sample from our economy would conclude that the average investor is return
extrapolating and has a belief that correlates negatively with the true risk premium. The
reason for this is similar to why young agents have a negative correlation between the per-
ceived risk premium and the true risk premium. In our economy, the average belief about
the risk premium a population survey overweights young agents relative to older more
experienced agents who are more important in determining prices. This effect is so strong
that the covariance between the average or consensus belief about growth and the market
view is higher than the variance of the market view and, consequently, there is a negative
correlation between the true risk premium and the consensus risk premium.
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. First, there is an emerging but already
influential empirical literature documenting learning from experience, which serves as the
main assumption for our model. An early work in this field is Vissing-Jorgensen (2003),
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which studies, among other things, whether investors extrapolate their own experience. A
seminal paper in the finance literature is Malmendier and Nagel (2011); the paper shows
that individuals who have experienced high stock market or bond market returns are more
likely to take on further financial risks, i.e., are more likely to participate in the stock
market or bond market and allocate a higher proportion of their liquid assets to stocks or
bonds. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) also provide empirical evidence pointing directly to the
importance of experience for beliefs.3 According to their view, experience effects could be the
result of attempts to learn where all available historical data is used but not entirely trusted.4
Further, in a follow up paper, Malmendier and Nagel (2016) show that individuals adapt
their inflation forecasts to new data but overweight inflation realized during their life-times,
that young agents update more aggressively in response to news, and that learning from
experience can explain the substantial disagreement in periods of high surprise inflation.5
Second, our paper speaks to the literature that studies the relation between risk premia
extracted from survey data and statistical measures of risk premia. Greenwood and Shleifer
(2014) show that survey based measures of expectations (i) correlate positively with past
stock returns, but (ii) correlate negatively with future returns. The positive correlation in
(i) suggests that survey respondents extrapolate returns, while the negative correlation in
(ii) suggests that when survey respondents expect high returns, then future returns tend to
be low. By analyzing global equities, currencies, and global fixed income, Koijen, Schmeling,
and Vrugt (2015) highlight how pervasive the evidence of a negative relation between survey
based expectations and future returns is. Further, Martin (2016) derives a measure for the
equity premium from option prices and shows that it correlates negatively with average risk
premia from survey data. Our model with learning from experience based bias proposes an
3Malmendier and Nagel (2011) point to the psychology literature that argues that personal, especially
recent, experiences impact decisions to a greater extent than education and statistical summary information
in books.
4Using age as measure of managers' investment experience, Greenwood and Nagel (2009) show that young
managers trend-chase in their technology stock investments, while old managers do not.
5There is also a related literature that studies how experiences influence investment decision: Kaustia
and Knüpfer (2008), Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2009), Chiang, Hishleifer, Qian, and Sherman
(2011), Strahilevitz, Odean, and Barber (2011), and Knüpfer, Rantapuska, and Sarvimäki (2016).
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equilibrium channel for this empirical regularity.
Third, our paper relates to the asset pricing literature with heterogeneous agents. We
mention Gârleanu and Panageas (2015), who also study a continuous-time overlapping gener-
ations economy. Their focus is on the quantitative implications of heterogeneity in recursive
preferences. Seminal works in the literature on asset pricing with disagreement include Har-
rison and Kreps (1978), Detemple and Murthy (1994), Zapatero (1998), and Basak (2000).6
Our model differs from this literature in that we employ a continuum of agents, where young
agents endogenously chase trends in returns but over time endogenously become contrari-
ans. Perhaps most importantly, we contribute to the literature by solving a continuous-time
overlapping generations model with disagreement. This allows us to address a different set
of economic questions than the above mentioned papers. Methodologically this is also quite
different. The typical approach in the disagreement literature is to use a central planner
with fixed Pareto weights. In contrast, the Pareto weights in our model depend on the
state of nature at birth and are determined as a part of the equilibrium. Despite of this
complication, our paper presents a closed-form solution. Moreover, it is standard in the dis-
agreement literature to consider infinitely lived agents, which implies non-stationarity, since
agents with more accurate beliefs accumulate wealth and eventually dominate the economy
as shown in the market selection literature.7 In our model with overlapping generations,
one cohort cannot dominate the economy because agents are continuously born and die. We
close by relating to Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (2015); they consider a model
with exogenously defined return extrapolators and rational agents. In their economy, all
return extrapolators perceive the same dynamics and never change type, while in our model
there is an endogenous and smooth transition from appearing as a return extrapolator to
6Models with disagreement include, among many others, Basak (2005), Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal
(2009), Xiong and Yan (2010), Cvitanic and Malamud (2011), Cvitanic, Jouini, Malamud, and Napp (2012),
Bhamra and Uppal (2014), and Ehling, Gallmeyer, Heyerdahl-Larsen, and Illeditsch (2016).
7See, for instance, Blume and Easley (1992), Sandroni (2000), and Kogan, Ross, and Westerfield (2006).
Although the market selection process can be slow as illustrated by Yan (2008) and Dumas, Kurshev, and
Uppal (2009), it can be quite powerful if agents have access to many securities as in Fedyk, Heyerdahl-Larsen,
and Walden (2013).
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eventually become a contrarian.
Fourth, we discuss several related papers that study the impact of an experience bias on
asset prices. Perhaps the first paper in this strand of literature is Schraeder (2016). Her
discrete-time and finite-horizon economy with up to eight overlapping generations connects
trading volume to volatility, excess volatility, overreaction, and price reversals, among other
results. Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2016) consider two dynasties and recur-
sive preferences with a focus on matching asset pricing moments. In their model, due to
preference for early resolution of uncertainty, young agents behave as more risk averse than
the old. Hence, experience has a dual role as inexperienced agents behave as more risk averse
and have less accurate beliefs. Buss, Uppal, and Vilkov (2015) study a general equilibrium
model with two risky assets where one of the risky assets is an alternative asset that is opaque
and illiquid. They show that inexperienced agents initially tilt their portfolio away from the
alternative asset, but eventually increase their position as they accumulate experience. Sur-
prisingly, lower transaction costs for the alternative asset can amplify the initial portfolio tilt,
as it is less costly to rebalance towards the alternative asset when the investor becomes more
experienced. Recently, Malmendier, Pouzo, and Vanasco (2017) consider a discrete-time
overlapping generations model with CARA utility and consumption from terminal wealth.
They show that stock price volatility and autocorrelations are higher when more agents rely
on recent observations. Moreover, when the disagreement across generations is high, then
there is higher trading volume in the stock market. Our model differs in that it has a more
general cohort and demographic structure, more general structure for priors, and still allows
for closed-form solutions. Further, none of the above mentioned papers studies the negative
relation between survey based measures of the risk premium and the true risk premium.
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2 The Model
We consider a continuous-time overlapping generations economy in the tradition of Blanchard
(1985). Currently living agents die at rate ν > 0; dead agents are replaced by newborn agents
at rate ν, so the total population size is constant and normalized to equal 1. The time-t
size of the cohort born at time s < t is, therefore, νe−ν(t−s)ds. At time t, all living agents
receive an endowment of earnings ys,t, where ys,t = ωYt for ω ∈ (0, 1). In addition, there is
a representative firm paying out Dt = (1 − ω)Yt in dividends.8 Hence, aggregate output is∫ t
−∞ νe
−ν(t−s)ωYtds+Dt = Yt and it follows the process
dYt/Yt = µY dt+ σY dzt, (1)
where zt is a standard Brownian motion.
2.1 Information, Learning, and Disagreement
To introduce a role for experience, we make the following assumptions regarding information
structure, the learning process, and disagreement across agents. Agents know ω and observe
aggregate output, but do not know expected output growth µY . An agent born at time s has
a normally distributed prior about expected output growth with mean, µˆs,s, and variance
Vˆ > 0. Hence, different cohorts can have different initial beliefs about expected output
growth, but share the same prior variance, Vˆ .
Once born, agents use Bayes' rule to update their beliefs about expected aggregate output
growth. By standard filtering theory, the dynamics of the expected output growth, µˆs,t, as
perceived by an agent born at time s at time t, and its posterior variance, Vˆs,t, are
dµˆs,t =
Vˆs,t
σY
dzs,t, Vˆs,t =
σ2Y Vˆ
σ2Y + Vˆ (t− s)
, (2)
8In the Internet Appendix, we consider a version of the model without a dividend paying stock, where
agents instead trade in a security in zero net supply. This equilibrium corresponds to the limiting case ω → 1.
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respectively, and where zs,t denotes a Brownian motion under the belief of an agent born
at time s with associated probability P s and information set (or sigma algebra) FYs,t =
σ (Y (u), s ≤ u ≤ t). The posterior variance, Vˆs,t, decreases over time as agents learn about
the true output growth.
Agents know σY and since the perceived output dynamics of an agent born at time s is
dYt/Yt = µˆs,tdt+ σY dzs,t, it follows that perceived and true shocks are linked through
dzs,t = dzt −∆s,tdt, (3)
where ∆s,t =
µˆs,t−µY
σY
is the standardized estimation error of an agent born at time s. Hence,
using Equation (3) the dynamics of the expected output growth of an agent born at time s,
under the true probability measure, is
dµˆs,t = − Vˆs,t
σY
∆s,tdt+
Vˆs,t
σY
dzt. (4)
From the definition of the standardized estimation error and the solution of the stochastic
differential equation in Equation (4), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The estimation error at time t of the cohort born at time s is
∆s,t =
σ2Y
σ2Y + Vˆ (t− s)
∆s,s +
Vˆ
σ2Y + Vˆ (t− s)
(zt − zs) . (5)
Moreover, we have that ∆s,s =
µˆs,s−µY
σY
and limt−s→∞∆s,t = 0 a.s.
2.2 Security Markets and Prices
Agents can trade in three securities: 1) an instantaneously risk-free asset, 2) units of a share
in the representative firm, and 3) annuities to hedge mortality risk. The instantaneously
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risk-free asset is in zero net supply and with dynamics given by
dBt/Bt = rtdt, (6)
where rt denotes the real short rate determined in equilibrium.
We normalize the supply of shares in the representative firm to one and denote its price
by St. The corresponding return process, Rt, evolves according to
dRt = (dSt +Dtdt)/St = µ
S
t dt+ σ
S
t dzt = µ
S
s,tdt+ σ
S
t dzs,t, (7)
where µSs,t and σ
S
t are determined in equilibrium. Further, agents agree on current prices,
but disagree about their probability distribution in the future. Using the relation between
the perceived and actual shocks in Equation (3), we have that µSs,t = µ
S
t + σ
S
t ∆s,t.
Annuity contracts, as in Yaari (1965), entitle to an income stream of νWs,t per unit of
time, where Ws,t is the financial wealth at time t of an agent born at time s. In return, the
competitive insurance industry receives all financial wealth when the agent dies.
It is convenient to summarize the price system in terms of the stochastic discount factor.
Since agents have different beliefs, they have individual stochastic discount factors that
differ from the stochastic discount factor under the true probability measure. The stochastic
discount factor as perceived by an agent born at time s, ξs,t, and the one under the true
probability measure, ξt, follow the dynamics
dξs,t/ξs,t = −rtdt− θs,tdzs,t, dξt/ξt = −rtdt− θtdzt. (8)
We have that the relation between the market price of risk as perceived by the cohort born
at time s, θs,t, and the market price of risk under the objective probability measure, θt, is
θs,t = θt+∆s,t. Following Basak (2000), we define the disagreement process, ηs,t, through the
relation between the stochastic discount factor under the objective measure and the belief
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of an agent born at time s, i.e., ξt = ηs,tξs,t. Formally, ηs,t is the Radon Nikodym derivative
that allows to move from the probability measure of an agent born at time s to the actual
probability measure and vice versa. The dynamics of the disagreement process, ηs,t, is (see
Appendix A for details)
dηs,t/ηs,t = ∆s,tdzt. (9)
2.3 Preferences and Individual Optimization
Agents maximize lifetime utility given by
Es,s
[∫ τ
s
e−ρ(t−s)log (cs,t) dt
]
, (10)
where τ is the stochastic time of death. In Equation (10), the first time subscript in the
expectation operator denotes the probability measure of the expectation. We use the con-
vention that expectation operators with one time subscript denotes the objective probability
measure. Since the random time of death, τ , is independent of aggregate output and expo-
nentially distributed, we integrate it out to write the expected lifetime utility as
Es,s
[∫ ∞
s
e−(ρ+ν)(t−s)log (cs,t) dt
]
. (11)
The dynamics of financial wealth, Ws,t, of an agent born at time s who is entitled to the
earnings, ωYt, follows
dWs,t =
(
rtWs,t + pis,t
(
µSs,t − rt
)
+ νWs,t + ωYt − cs,t
)
dt+ pis,tσ
S
t dzs,t, Ws,s = 0, (12)
where pis,t denotes the dollar amount held in the risky asset. Since agents are born without
any financial wealth, we have that Ws,s = 0.
All agents maximize expected utility from lifetime consumption, Equation (11), subject
to the wealth dynamics in Equation (12).
11
2.4 Equilibrium
We start by defining an equilibrium.
Definition 1. Given preferences, endowments, and beliefs, an equilibrium is a collection
of allocations (cs,t, pis,t) and a price system
(
rt, µ
S
s,t, σ
S
t
)
such that the processes (cs,t, pis,t)
maximize utility given in Equation (11) subject to the dynamic budget constraint given in
Equation (12) and markets clear:
∫ t
−∞
νe−ν(t−s)cs,tds = Yt, (13)∫ t
−∞
νe−ν(t−s)pis,tds = St, (14)∫ t
−∞
νe−ν(t−s) (Ws,t − pis,t) ds = 0. (15)
After birth, the market is dynamically complete for each cohort.9 Thus, we solve the indi-
vidual optimization problems by martingale methods as in Cox and Huang (1989). Consider
an agent born at time s. The static optimization problem for this agent is
max
cs
Es,s
[∫ ∞
s
e−(ρ+ν)(t−s)log (cs,t) dt
]
s.t.
Es,s
[∫ ∞
s
e−ν(t−s)ξs,tcs,tdt
]
= Es,s
[∫ ∞
s
e−ν(t−s)ξs,tωYtdt
]
. (16)
From the first order conditions (FOCs), we have
e−(ρ+ν)(t−s)
cs,t
= κse
−ν(t−s)ξs,t, (17)
where κs denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the static budget constraint given in Equation
9We verify that the equilibrium risky security is spanning the output risk, i.e., σSt > 0 for all times and
states.
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(16). For s ≤ u ≤ t the FOCs imply
e−(ρ+ν)(t−u)
(
cs,u
cs,t
)
= e−ν(t−u)
ξs,t
ξs,u
. (18)
Using the FOCs in Equation (18), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Optimal consumption at time t of agents born at time s ≤ t ≤ τ is
cs,t = cs,se
−ρ(t−s)
(
ηs,t
ηs,s
)(
ξs
ξt
)
. (19)
The optimal consumption in Proposition 2 contains the unknown initial consumption,
cs,s. What we see already is that the initial consumption relates inversely to the Lagrange
multiplier, κs, which can be interpreted as a state dependent Pareto weight. The reason why
it is stochastic is that agents cannot hedge against output fluctuations prior to birth.
Remark 1. Interpreting the initial consumption as the inverse of the stochastic Pareto weight
highlights a key difference in our model relative to the literature on disagreement discussed in
the introduction, where the approach is often to specify the Pareto weights exogenously, then
solve for the corresponding wealth allocations. This approach is not possible in our model
as the economy imposes a specific relation between the stochastic aggregate output and the
wealth of a newborn.
The distribution of consumption or wealth is a state variable in models with heterogeneous
agents and, therefore, we define the consumption and wealth share of each cohort as follows:
Definition 2.
1. The consumption share of the cohort born at time s < t is f cs,t =
νe−ν(t−s)cs,t
Yt
.
2. The wealth share of the cohort born at time s < t is fWs,t =
νe−ν(t−s)Wˆs,t
Wˆt
,
where Wˆt denotes aggregate wealth in the economy.
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Remark 2. A property of models featuring infinitely lived heterogeneous agents is that there
is a market selection mechanism through which one type of the agents dominates the economy
in the long run. More specifically, with heterogeneous beliefs, the agents with beliefs closer
to the correct estimate drive investors with less precise beliefs out of the markets. In our
overlapping generations economy, all agents vanish in the long run since they die. Still, the
market selection mechanism is at work because young agents with less precise beliefs lose out
to older and more experienced agents on average.
Due to log utility, the consumption and wealth shares are equal. To see this, consider
the following. At time u ≥ s, the value of the endowment of earnings of an agent born at
time s is Hs,u =
1
ξs,u
Es,u
[∫∞
u
e−ν(t−s)ξs,tωYtdt
]
. Total wealth is financial wealth, Ws,u, plus
the present value of all future earnings, that is, Wˆs,u = Hs,u +Ws,u. Using the static budget
constraint, we obtain
cs,u = (ρ+ ν) Wˆs,u. (20)
Equation (20) confirms that the well known result of a constant consumption-wealth ratio
in a log utility setting also holds in our overlapping generations model with incomplete
information and disagreement. Using the market clearing conditions and Equation (20), we
have
Yt =
∫ t
−∞
νe−ν(t−s)cs,tds =
∫ t
−∞
νe−ν(t−s) (ρ+ ν) Wˆs,tds = (ρ+ ν) Wˆt, (21)
and, consequently, aggregate wealth, Wˆt, is given by
Wˆt =
Yt
ρ+ ν
. (22)
It follows from Equation (20), Equation (22), and Definition 2 that the consumption and
wealth shares equate and, thus, we use fs,t = f
W
s,t to denote the wealth share. Since the
wealth share appears in several equilibrium quantities, we define two moments based on it.
Definition 3. Define the infinite sequence xt = (xs,t)s<t and the following operators:
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1. The wealth weighted average is E (xt) =
∫ t
−∞ fs,txs,tds.
2. The wealth weighted variance is V (xt) =
∫ t
−∞ fs,t (xs,t − E (xt))2 ds,
where xs,t is any time t quantity associated with the cohort born at time s.
Using the market clearing in Equation (13) and the optimal consumption in Proposition
2, we solve for the stochastic discount factor as a function of the disagreement processes,
ηs,t, aggregate output, Yt, and initial consumption, cs,s. While the disagreement processes
are determined by the learning and aggregate output is exogenous, the initial consumption
shares have to be computed as a part of the equilibrium. To do so, we conjecture that the
initial consumption share of a newborn is constant across time and states, then we verify
this by solving for the value of the aggregate endowment of earnings and the stock market.
Following this approach, the next proposition characterizes the stochastic discount factor.
Proposition 3. In equilibrium, the stochastic discount factor is
ξt = η¯t
e−(ρ+ν(1−β))t
Yt
, (23)
where η¯t solves the integral equation
η¯t =
∫ t
−∞
βνe−βν(t−s)η¯s
ηs,t
ηs,s
ds, (24)
where β = ρ+2ν
2ν
−
√
ρ2+4(ρ+ν)ν(1−ω)
2ν
represents the fraction of total output consumed by a
newborn agent, i.e., ct,t = βYt. Moreover, η¯t is a local martingale with dynamics
dη¯t = ∆¯tη¯tdzt, (25)
where ∆¯t = E (∆t) denotes the wealth weighted average standardized estimation error in the
economy and where
fs,t = βνe
−βν(t−s)ηs,t/ηs,s
η¯t/η¯s
, (26)
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is the equilibrium wealth share.
It is useful to decompose the stochastic discount factor:
ξt =
e−ρt
Yt︸︷︷︸
Log utility discount factor
× e−ν(1−β)t︸ ︷︷ ︸
OLG effect
× η¯t︸︷︷︸
Experience effect
. (27)
Equation (27) shows that the stochastic discount factor has three parts: 1) a discount factor
that prevails in an economy with an infinitely lived representative agent with log utility and
complete information, 2) an effect coming from the overlapping generations structure, and
3) an effect from disagreement about expected output growth across cohorts. While the first
part is straightforward, it is worth discussing the second and the third parts.
The overlapping generations structure affects the stochastic discount factor through a
generational replacement effect. Agents are born without financial wealth and, hence, they
have a lower consumption than the population average. The agents invest to buy units of
the share of the representative firm and by doing so they have an expected consumption
growth that is higher than the expected growth in aggregate output. This effect holds even
in a setting with complete information.
The third part, η¯t, is due to learning from experience. As pointed out in Proposition 3, η¯t
is a local martingale and has the properties of a Radon Nikodym derivative. We can interpret
the stochastic discount factor as the discount factor of a hypothetical representative agent
with a belief given by the wealth weighted average belief, µ¯t = E (µˆt), which we call the
market view. The market view captures the fact that agents with a larger wealth share are
more important in determining the price and, therefore, their belief carries a larger weight in
the belief of this representative agent. Using this belief, ∆¯t in Proposition 3 then measures
the standardized estimation error of the market view, i.e., ∆¯t =
µ¯t−µY
σY
.
Proposition 3 also characterizes the wealth shares of the different cohorts, fs,t. The first
part, βνe−βν(t−s), represents the wealth share in an overlapping generations economy without
learning from experience. In such an economy, the wealth share declines at a rate of βν,
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which reflects the mortality risk and that young agents are born without financial wealth
and, thus, save to accumulate it over time. Given that β < 1, the rate of decay of the cohort
wealth share is slower than that due to mortality. The second part, ηs,t/ηs,s
η¯t/η¯s
, captures the
likelihood of observing a particular value of output at time t as a realization under the belief
of an agent born at time s relative to that of the market view. Consequently, the wealth
share is increasing whenever the data is more supportive of the belief of an agent born at
time s relative to the market view. Given the stochastic discount factor in Proposition 3,
we can apply Ito's lemma and match the drift and diffusion coefficients with the dynamics
in Equation (8) to solve for the the real short rate and the market price of risk.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, the real short rate is
rt = ρ+ µ¯t + ν (1− β)− σ2Y , (28)
and the market price of risk is
θt = σY − 1
σY
(µ¯t − µY ) . (29)
The expression for the real short rate deviates from the one in an economy with an in-
finitely lived log utility agent by two terms. First, in a log utility economy, the intertemporal
smoothing motive depends on the expected output growth. A higher growth implies a higher
interest rate as the demand for borrowing increases. However, in Equation (28) the interest
rate does not depend on the true expected output growth. Instead, it depends on the market
view. The reason for this is that wealthier agents are more important in determining prices
and, therefore, the real short rate reflects the view of the wealthier agents more than the view
of the poorer agents. Second, due to the generational replacement effect the real short rate
is higher in the overlapping generations economy than in a representative agent economy.
We see that in addition to the standard compensation for output risk, the market price
of risk is taking into account that agents in the economy might have a belief about output
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growth that differs from the true value. Specifically, we see that when the market is optimistic
about expected growth, i.e., µ¯t > µY , then the market price of risk is low. Indeed, under
the true probability measure, the risky asset is expensive and, thus, the market price of risk
must be low.
Remark 3. An alternative way of expressing the real short rate and the market price of
risk is to explicitly write them in terms of the market's estimation error, ∆¯t,
rt =
Log utility economy︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρ+ µY − σ2Y +
OLG︷ ︸︸ ︷
ν (1− β) +
Experience effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
σY ∆¯t , (30)
θt = σY︸︷︷︸
Log utility economy
− ∆¯t︸︷︷︸
Experience effect
. (31)
From the point of view of an econometrician with the correct estimate of the expected output
growth, the real short rate is distorted by the market's estimation error. Hence, when the
market is optimistic about output growth, ∆¯t > 0, then the econometrician perceives the real
short rate as too high and the compensation for risk too low.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium excess return and the volatility of the
stock market.
Proposition 5. In equilibrium, the expected excess return on the stock market is
µSt − rt = σSt
(
σY − 1
σY
(µ¯t − µY )
)
, (32)
and the volatility of the stock market is
σSt = σY . (33)
From Equation (33), we see that the volatility of the stock market is not affected by
learning from experience and is identical to that of an economy with complete information,
which is due to log preferences.
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The next proposition characterizes the optimal portfolio policy of an agent born at time
s.
Proposition 6. The optimal dollar amount invested in the risky asset, pis,t, for an agent
born at time s is
pis,t = Ws,t +
µˆs,t − µ¯t
σ2Y
Wˆs,t. (34)
To understand the optimal portfolio choice in Proposition 6, first consider the case with
homogeneous beliefs which corresponds to µˆs,t = µ¯t for all s ≤ t. In this case, the second term
in Equation (6) vanishes and the optimal choice is simply to invest the entire financial wealth
in the risky asset. This is intuitive as there is no form of heterogeneity in beliefs or preferences
and, therefore, in equilibrium the optimal choice must be to hold the market portfolio. Now
consider the case in which µˆs,t > µ¯t, i.e., the agent is more optimistic about expected output
growth than the market view. The optimal choice is to deviate from the market portfolio by
investing more in the risky asset. The amount is determined by the excess risk premium,
µˆs,t − µ¯t, perceived by the agent born at time s. Given log preferences, the optimal choice
is to increase total exposure of wealth by the excess risk premium scaled by the variance of
the market.
3 Dynamic Properties of the Model
In this section, we examine the dynamics of the equilibrium in Section 2. First, we study
the properties of the equilibrium stock market risk premium. Second, we show how agents
perceive the risk premium on the stock market and how this translates into differing optimal
portfolios. Third, given the heterogeneity in beliefs about the risk premium, we examine how
the average belief (instead of the market view), frequently used in the empirical literature,
relates to the true risk premium.
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3.1 Parameters
The model has seven parameters
(
ρ, ν, ω, µY , σY , µˆs,s, Vˆ
)
. We follow Gârleanu and Panageas
(2015) and set the time discount factor, ρ, at 0.1%, the birth and death intensity, ν, at 2%,
and the share of earnings in output, ω, at 0.92 to match the fraction of capital income in
national income. The drift, µY , and volatility, σY , of aggregate output are set to 2% and
3.3%, respectively, which is similar to Gârleanu and Panageas (2015) and to the long sample
in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). The parameters determining the learning from experience
based bias are the prior belief, µˆs,s, and the prior variance, Vˆ . To put discipline on how we
set these two parameters, we assume for the prior belief, µˆs,s, and the prior variance, Vˆ , of
an agent born at time s that the agent observes the output during the first part of the life
before starting to trade at age of 20. Further, the initial prior at time s − 20, i.e., at the
actual birth of the agent, is diffuse.10 Consequently, the prior variance at the point when the
agent enters the market is Vˆ =
σ2Y
20
= 0.033
2
20
. According to Equation (2), a newborn updates
her belief about expected growth by Vˆ
σY
= 0.033
20
= 0.165% of the shock, which corresponds
to 5% of the volatility of aggregate output. For comparison, according to the estimate in
Malmendier and Nagel (2016) the response to inflation shocks of a 20 year old's belief about
expected inflation is 4% of the volatility of inflation. The prior belief about expected output
growth depends on the realizations of the shocks to output over the first 20 years and is
given by µˆs,s = µY + σY
zs−zs−20
20
. Hence, on average agents start with the correct belief and
the 95% confidence interval on the initial belief is (0.0055, 0.0345). With this specification
of the prior beliefs, the cross-sectional standard deviation of beliefs (disagreement) in the
economy is 26 basis points. In comparison, the cross-sectional standard deviation about real
GDP growth using the Survey of Professional Forecasters over the period Q1 1992 to Q4
10One alternative to using 20 years as a pre-trading period to learn is to use µˆs,s and Vˆ as free parameters.
A natural choice for µˆs,s is the correct value, i.e., assuming that the agent is born with an unbiased prior.
One can think of this as the agent being told what the correct value is, but she does not fully trust it. The
drawback of it is that at birth all newborn agents are more correct than someone who has been trading for
a while. Another alternative is to use a distribution for the priors. The Internet Appendix contains one
example of both alternatives.
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2016 is 48 basis points. The value of the birth and death intensity, ν, implies an average life
of 50 years and including the pre-period gives an effective average age of 70 years. Although
we set the initial belief by using 20 years of data, below we still refer to an agent as newborn
when entering the market to trade and all references to age are from the time when the agent
starts trading.11
3.2 The Dynamics of the Risk Premium and the Real Short Rate
Proposition 4 shows that the real short rate and the market price of risk depend on the market
view, µ¯t. Hence, to understand their dynamics it is important to examine the properties of
the market view.
Proposition 7. The dynamics of the market view, µ¯t, is
dµ¯t = βν (µˆt,t − µ¯t) dt− V¯t
σY
∆¯tdt+
V¯t
σY
dzt. (35)
where V¯t = E
(
Vˆt
)
+ V (µˆt) > 0,
Proposition 7 shows that the diffusion depends on both the wealth weighted average
posterior variance E
(
Vˆt
)
and the wealth weighted variance of the beliefs about output
growth V (µˆt). Comparing the first term, E(Vˆt)σY , to the diffusion of the individual agents'
beliefs in Equation (4), we see that this captures the wealth weighted average diffusion
coefficient in the individual agents' belief.
The second term, V(µˆt)
σY
, is the cross-sectional variance of beliefs about the output growth
in the economy scaled by the output volatility, σY . For the same reason as for the first
term, the variance is calculated using the wealth distribution. Both E
(
Vˆt
)
and V (µˆt) are
positive. Hence, in response to an output shock the market view increases. This is intuitive
as all agents in the economy revise their expectations upwards after a positive shock and
11Given the parameters, the unconditional values of the real short rate and the risk premium are 2.52%
and 0.11%, respectively. These values correspond to the one of an equivalent economy without learning from
experience. Hence, the model cannot speak to the equity premium and the interest rate puzzles.
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the market view is simply the wealth weighted average belief in the economy. However, as
V (µˆt) is positive, the market view reacts more than just the wealth weighted average update
by the agents in the economy, i.e., there is an overreaction. To understand the overreaction,
consider a positive shock to output. In this case, all agents revise their expectation upwards
and, therefore, the market view becomes relatively more optimistic, which is the first effect
captured by E
(
Vˆt
)
. In addition, after a positive shock to output, relative more optimistic
agents accumulate wealth, which in turn increases the weight on their belief in the market
view. The second effect is due to the trading among the agents based on their beliefs, and the
trading is more aggressive when the disagreement is high. Consequently, when disagreement
is high in the economy and wealth is relatively evenly distributed, then the market view reacts
stronger to shocks to output than when the disagreement is low and wealth is concentrated
among few agents with relatively similar beliefs.
Now turning to the drift of the market view, we see that it also contains two terms.
The first term, βν (µˆt,t − µ¯t), is due to the overlapping generations structure. The aggregate
wealth share of the newborn is βν and the term captures that newborn agents, in general,
have an initial belief that differs from the market view. The second term, − V¯t
σY
∆¯t, mean-
reverts with speed of mean reversion given by V¯t
σY
. Hence, the market view has the same
ratio between the speed of mean reversion and the diffusion coefficient as the belief of the
individual agents. As expected, the speed of mean reversion of the market view depends
on the wealth weighted average posterior variance. However, it also depends on the wealth
weighted variance of the beliefs, V (µˆt), since the market also learns through market se-
lection. Specifically, consider a shock that increases the wealth weighted variance of the
beliefs. In this case, relative to before the shock, the economy has more room for speculative
trade.12 Hence, the trading based on beliefs is more aggressive and individual agents have
large exposure to output shocks. Importantly, as agents with particular high or low belief
about output growth are expected to lose on average and the market selection is stronger
12The wealth weighted variance of beliefs can increase because the disagreement of individual agents is
higher than before the shock or because wealth is less concentrated among agents with similar beliefs.
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the higher the exposure, the market view is pushed towards the true expected growth at a
higher rate.
As the discussion above shows, the updating of the market view has similarities with how
individual agents update their beliefs, but it also has differences. One way to think about the
market view is that it is the belief of a representative agent that prices the market. However,
the dynamics of the belief of this representative agent is different from that of any of the
individual agents in the economy. Specifically, from this hypothetical representative agent's
point of view, the wealth weighted cross-sectional distribution of beliefs acts as uncertainty
about expected output growth, because shocks to output not only move individual agents'
beliefs, but also the wealth distribution and, therefore, the representative agent puts more
weight on agents with beliefs that are more consistent with the direction of the shock.
Hence, in the eyes of the representative agent the changes to the wealth distribution act
as preference shocks correlated with output shocks.
So how much is the market view reacting to news? Using the above parameter values,
the average value of the diffusion coefficient,
E(Vˆt)
σY
+ V(µˆt)
σY
, is 7.5 basis points, which is 45%
of that of a newborn, which is 16.5 basis points. The unconditional standard deviation is 35
basis points. Further,
E(Vˆt)
σY
and V(µˆt)
σY
in the diffusion coefficient of the market view are both
important as they account for 74% and 26%, respectively. Therefore, more than a quarter
of the response of the market view to a shock is due to wealth reallocations.
Combining the dynamics of the market view with the expressions for the real short rate
and market price of risk, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 8. After a positive shock to aggregate output (dzt > 0), the risk-free rate
increases, i.e., ∂rt
∂z
> 0, and the market price of risk and the risk premium on the stock
market decrease, i.e., ∂θt
∂z
< 0 and
∂(µSt −rt)
∂z
< 0.
The intuition for Proposition 8 is the following. Since the market view increases after
a positive shock, the real short rate increases as the relevant expectation of the aggregate
output growth is that of the market view, and a higher market view implies a higher in-
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tertemporal smoothing motive. Also, from the point of view of an econometrician with
perfect knowledge of the true parameter the stock price looks too high, or put differently
the risk premium has decreased relative to before the shock.
Remark 4. Consumption based asset pricing models in which the risk premium declines in
response to a positive shock are sometimes interpreted to be consistent with the empirical
evidence in Fama and French (1989) that the risk premium on the stock market is counter-
cyclical, although there is no cycle in these models in the conventional sense as shocks are
permanent. According to Proposition 8, our model produces a joint decline in the market
price of risk and the risk premium on the stock relative to a positive output shock and an
increase in the real short rate relative to a positive output shock. The decrease in the risk
premium after a positive shock is qualitatively comparable, for example, to Campbell and
Cochrane (1999).
3.3 Perceived Risk Premium
The objective probability measure will, in general, be different from the probability measure
of individual agents. Specifically, from Proposition 5 and the relation between the perceived
and the true shock, the risk premium on the stock market as perceived by an agent born at
time s < t is
µSs,t − rt =
Risk premium under the true measure︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ2Y − µ¯t + µY +
Experience based bias︷ ︸︸ ︷
µˆs,t − µY . (36)
Simplifying Equation (36), the perceived risk premium can be written as µSs,t − rt = σ2Y +
µˆs,t − µ¯t and, consequently, it is higher than the true risk premium whenever µˆs,t − µ¯t > 0.
We know from Proposition 8 that the true risk premium decreases after a positive shock.
But how does the belief about the risk premium of an agent born at time s react to a shock?
To examine this, consider the covariance between the true risk premium and the perceived
risk premium
cov(µSs,t − rt, µSt − rt) = var(µ¯t)− cov(µ¯t, µˆs,t). (37)
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From Equation (37), we see that the variance of the market view always pushes the covariance
between the true risk premium and the perceived risk premium towards the positive region.
However, as the perceived output growth, µˆs,t, and the market view both increase after
a positive shock, the covariance between the belief about the output growth of the agent
born at time s and the market view is positive. Hence, it contributes towards pushing
the covariance of the true and the perceived risk premium towards the negative region. If
the covariance between the two is sufficiently high, then this outweighs the variance term
and, consequently, the correlation between the perceived and the true risk premium can be
negative.
Figure 1: True and Perceived Risk Premium. The figure shows the correlation between the risk
premium under the true measure and the perceived risk premium (left plot) and the correlation between
the perceived risk premium and stock market shocks (right plot) by cohort lifespan. Each observation is
calculated using a window of 60 non-overlapping observations (5 years). The figure is averaged from 10, 000
simulations with 1200 periods or 100 years per simulation.
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The left plot in Figure 1 shows that the average correlation between the true and the
perceived risk premium as a function of age is strongly negative with a value of −0.45 over the
first 5 years of trading, from where it increases monotonically in age. The reason for this is
that young agents update very aggressively and, therefore, the variance of their belief about
output growth is high and, consequently, the covariance term in Equation (37) outweighs
the variance term. As an agent gains more experience, the covariance term becomes less
important and the correlation between the true and the perceived risk premium increases,
reaching one in the limit. We see that the correlation in the left plot in Figure 1 is not
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symmetric around zero, which is because of the positive contribution from the variance of
the market view.
The right plot in Figure 1 shows that the beliefs of young agents are positively correlated
with shocks to the stock market. As they gain experience, the correlation declines and
becomes strongly negative when old. Therefore, young agents form expectations that mimics
return extrapolation. Specifically, consider a positive shock to output which also corresponds
to a positive shock to the stock market. In this case, young agents revise their beliefs about
expected output growth upwards by more than the market does and, hence, from their point
of view the stock is now relatively cheap. In other words, the risk premium must be high to
justify the stock price from the point of view of young agents. Hence, the young keep raising
their beliefs about future returns when experiencing positive shocks to the stock market.
To formally link our model with return extrapolation, we express the belief about output
growth of an agent born at time s as a function of past stock returns.
Proposition 9. The belief about output growth at time t of an agent born at time s is
µˆs,t = − (ρ+ ν (1− β)) +REs,t, (38)
where REs,t =
1
20+t−s
∫ t
s−20 dRu is the average return experienced over the period s− 20 to t.
Therefore, the belief about output growth depends on the observed history of stock
returns through REs,t, which we refer to as the return extrapolation term. From the extrap-
olation term, we see that more experienced agents observe a longer history of stock returns
and, thus, the average return over their lifetime is closer to the true population value. Given
Equation (38), at time t the perceived risk premium of an agent born at time s is
µSs,t − rt =
True risk premium︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ2Y − E (REt) +REs,t. (39)
Hence, an agent who has experienced a better history of market returns than the wealth
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weighted population average perceives a higher risk premium. Moreover, agents for whom
REs,t increases more than the wealth weighted average, E (REt), after positive returns appear
as if they extrapolate from past returns.
Remark 5. Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (2015) consider a model with two types of
agents, namely return extrapolators and rational agents. Extrapolators believe that expected
stock price changes are linearly increasing in an index given by It = b
∫ t
−∞ e
−b(t−u)dSu−dt
for b > 0, where dSt is the instantaneous change in the stock price. They show that in
equilibrium the true expected stock price change is negatively related to the index. From
Equation (39) in our model, we see that the true expected risk premium relates negatively
to the extrapolative term REs,t and that young agents for whom REs,t reacts strongly to
past returns appear as if they extrapolate returns. However, in our economy a fraction of
agents behaves as return extrapolators endogenously and there is a smooth transition from
appearing as a return extrapolator when young to eventually become a contrarian when old,
while in Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (2015) all return extrapolators perceive the
same dynamics and never change type.
3.4 Consumption and Portfolio Choice
In this subsection, we study the consumption and portfolio choice of individual agents.
Within our model, the only reason to trade is differences in beliefs generated by learning
from experiences. The simplicity allows for a transparent analysis of the portfolio choice
within our model, with the caveat that we do not model features like incomplete markets
and life-cycle profiles of earnings, which are important determinants of consumers' portfolio
choice.13
Our results regarding the perceived risk premium provide a direct view at optimal portfo-
lio allocations. A positive shock increases young agents' expectations about the future stock
13We solve a model with a life-cycle profile of earnings as in Gârleanu and Panageas (2015) in the Internet
Appendix.
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market return. In turn, their demand for the risky asset increases. Old agents reduce their
expectations about the future excess returns relative to the young and, therefore, they reduce
their portfolio holdings in the risky asset. Figure 2, which shows the correlation between
portfolio allocations and shocks by cohort age, confirms this intuition. From the figure, we
see that young agents increase their position in the stock market after a positive shock, but
that the correlation declines monotonically over time, reaching a strong negative correlation
in ripe old age. The decline in the correlation as an agent ages can be understood from the
general equilibrium properties of the model. For the market to clear, old agents counter-
balance the portfolio allocations of the young. From Proposition 6, we see that the optimal
portfolio allocation is driven by the difference between agents' belief about output growth
and the market view, µˆs,t − µ¯t. Following a positive shock, dzt > 0, the young revise their
expectations about aggregate output growth more than the revision in the market view, since
V art(dµˆs,t) ≥ V art(dµ¯t). Hence, the young increase their allocation in the risky asset. Old
agents revise their expectations less than the market view, since V art(dµˆs,t) ≤ V art(dµ¯t).
Therefore, they counter-balance the behavior of the young by reducing their demand for the
risky asset, thereby the market clears.
The discussion above implies that in equilibrium there is an entire cross-section of ex-
trapolators and contrarians and that there is an endogenous and smooth transition from
appearing as a return extrapolator to eventually become a contrarian. As the true risk pre-
mium is decreasing after positive returns, young agents are on average buying at the wrong
time. So, what are the financial consequences of buying at the wrong time? To answer this
question, we characterize in Proposition 10 the dynamics of agents' log consumption.
Proposition 10. The dynamics of the log consumption, log (cs,t), for an agent born at time
s with t < τ is
dlog (cs,t) =
(
µY + ν (1− β)− 1
2
σ2Y +
1
2
(
∆¯2t −∆2s,t
))
dt+
(
σY + ∆s,t − ∆¯t
)
dzt. (40)
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Figure 2: Portfolios and Shocks. The figure plots the correlation between portfolio allocations and
stock market shocks by cohort lifespan. Each observation is calculated using a window of 60 non-overlapping
observations (5 years). The figure is averaged from 10, 000 simulations with 1200 periods or 100 years per
simulation.
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The bottom plot in Figure 3 shows the volatility of log consumption growth. Here we
see that the volatility of individual agents' consumption is substantially higher than the
aggregate consumption volatility, but more so for the very young agents. The reason for
this is that the agents trade on their beliefs and this amplifies the volatility of consumption
of each individual relative to the aggregate output volatility due to movements in wealth
shares. Further, the volatility does not decrease monotonically. This is because at a certain
age, an agent's belief looks very much like the wealth weighted average, which is the belief
that determines prices. Hence, for this age, the speculative component is low. However, for
both younger and older agents for which the market view dynamics differ substantially from
their own belief, the speculative trade is large.
The top plot in Figure 3 shows the expected value of the drift of log consumption as
a function of age. One can see that young individuals have much lower expected log con-
sumption growth, because they are making larger mistakes than older agents with more
experience. Proposition 10 captures this effect by the difference between the squared esti-
mation error of the market view and the squared estimation error of the individual agent. As
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long as the expected value of the squared estimation error is larger than that of the market,
the agent is expected to lose out and, hence, has a lower expected log consumption growth
than in a corresponding economy without the learning from experience bias.
Figure 3: Cohort Specific Log Consumption Growth and Volatility. The figure plots the drift
term of log consumption under the objective measure and the volatility of consumption growth by cohort
lifespan. The figure is averaged from 10, 000 simulations with 1200 periods or 100 years per simulation.
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Remark 6. Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson (2009) use a proprietary database to
provide evidence for the hypothesis that older adults make fewer financial mistakes than
younger adults, that is, they transition from inexperienced to experienced. More specifically,
Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson (2009) show that older and experienced investors
have greater investment knowledge. In addition, the survey based analysis in Arrondel, Calvo-
Pardo, and Tas (2014) suggests that investors' measure of information increases with past
experience.
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3.5 The Average Belief About the Risk Premium and the True Risk
Premium
In this subsection, we study the average belief about the risk premium. The average belief
is important as it is frequently used in the empirical literature to study if agents have biased
beliefs. Using survey data, Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) show that the average belief about
expected returns is highly positively correlated with past stock returns. Moreover, they show
that the average belief is negatively correlated with future returns. Hence, when the average
belief about future returns is high, on average realized returns tend to be low.
The findings that the average belief about expected excess returns is positively correlated
with past stock returns and negatively correlated with measures of ex ante risk premia and
future excess returns pose challenges to standard rational expectations models. On the onset,
it is not clear if the model with learning from experience can replicate such a relation between
returns and beliefs about risk premium. For instance, one could imagine that individual
mistakes about the risk premium wash out in aggregate and, therefore, the average belief
about the risk premium is unbiased. Moreover, one can imagine that the average belief about
the risk premium is positively correlated with the actual risk premium as agents are using
Bayes' rule to learn about expected output growth. However, as we show below, within our
economy we see a similar relation between 1) past stock returns and the current average
belief about the risk premium and 2) the average belief about the risk premium and the true
risk premium as in Greenwood and Shleifer (2014).
Definition 4. The average belief about the risk premium is
µˆSt − rt =
∫ t
−∞
νe−ν(t−s)µSs,tds− rt. (41)
The average belief about the risk premium is simply a population survey. Substituting
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Equation (36) into the definition of the average belief about the risk premium, we obtain
µˆSt − rt = σ2Y +
Average belief about output growth︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ t
−∞
νe−ν(t−s)µˆs,tds −µ¯t. (42)
From Equation (42), we see that the average belief about the risk premium depends on the
difference between the average belief about output growth and the market view. Importantly,
the average risk premium is positively related to the average belief about output growth, but
negatively related to the market view. Hence, if the average belief reacts more aggressively
than the market view in response to a shock, then the average belief about the risk premium
increases after positive output shocks. Since positive output shocks also correspond to posi-
tive shocks to the stock market, the average appears as if there is return extrapolation. To
test this, we follow Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) and regress the average belief about the
risk premium in Equation (42) onto last year's realized return.
Table 1: Returns, Risk Premium and Beliefs The table shows coefficient estimate from a regression
of (1) the average belief onto the return over the past 12 month: µˆSt − rt = a+ bRt−12,t+ et, (2) the true risk
premium onto the return over the past 12 month: µSt − rt = a+ bRt−12,t+ et, and (3) the true risk premium
onto the average belief: µSt − rt = a+ b
(
µˆSt − rt
)
+ et. Rt−12,t is the cumulative return over the previous 12
months. The regression uses data from 10, 000 simulations with 6000 periods (monthly observations) or 500
years per simulation, where coefficients, t-statistics, and R2 are averaged across the 10, 000 sample paths.
b t-stat R2
(1) 0.001 5.665 0.077
(2) -0.056 -90.077 0.708
(3) -1.410 -12.963 0.168
From regression (1) in Table 1, we see that the average belief about the risk premium is
positively correlated with past stock returns. Hence, from the point of view of an econome-
trician, the average investor in our economy looks like a return extrapolator. In comparison,
Table 3 in Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) shows the result from regressing six different sur-
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vey measures onto the stock market returns over the past 12 months.14 All the six survey
measures are positively related to past stock market returns and the R2 range from 0.002 to
0.611 with an average value of 0.210.15 If we instead regress the true risk premium onto past
stock market returns, we have a strong negative correlation as illustrated in regression (2) in
Table 1. Hence, after positive shocks, the risk premium declines consistent with Proposition
8.
Given the opposite sign in Table 1 for the average belief about the risk premium and
the true risk premium, we expect a negative relation between the average belief and the
true risk premium. Indeed, this is what we find. In our model, the correlation between the
average belief about the risk premium and the true risk premium is -0.193. For comparison,
Table 5 in Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) shows that the correlations between four different
measures of expected returns and average beliefs from six different surveys range from -0.807
to 0.366, with only 4 out of the 24 correlations being positive.16 The average value is -0.298,
which is slightly more negative than the correlation in our model. This is also consistent
with the evidence in Martin (2016). He derives a bound on the risk premium based on option
prices and shows that this measure of the risk premium not only predicts future returns with
the expected sign, but is negatively correlated with four different survey based measures of
the risk premium with correlation coefficients ranging from -0.37 to -0.53.17
In addition to being negatively correlated with the true risk premium, the average belief
about the risk premium is much less volatile. Specifically, the volatility of the average
belief about the risk premium in the model is only 15% of the volatility of the true risk
premium. This finding is consistent with Piazzesi, Salomao, and Schneider (2015), who find
14Specifically, Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) consider the following surveys: 1) Gallupp, 2) Graham and
Harvey, 3) American Association of Individual Investors survey (AAII), 4) Investors' Intelligence Newsletter
Expectations, 5) Shiller, and 6) Michigan Surveys of Consumer.
15As the survey measures of expectations in Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) all have different units, the
slope coefficients are not comparable.
16Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) consider the log dividend price ratio, the surplus consumption ratio, cay,
and the predicted risk premium using the log price dividend ratio, Treasury-bill rate, the default spread, and
the term spread jointly as measures of expected returns.
17Specifically, the estimates of the four correlation coefficients are -0.37 using AAII's survey, -0.46 using
Shiller's survey, -0.50 using Graham-Harvey's survey, and -0.53 using Gallup's survey.
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that statistical measures of the bond risk premium are more volatile than the bond risk
premium measured from survey data. They show that the ratio of the standard deviation
of survey based expectations of returns to statistical measures of the expected return ranges
from 0.53 to 0.65, depending on the statistical measure of expected returns. For the stock
market, Martin (2016) shows that the option based measure of expected return on the S&P
500 is highly volatile with standard deviations of 4.60% for 1 month horizon decreasing to
2.43% for the 1 year horizon using data from January 4, 1996 to January 31, 2012. For
comparison, the Graham-Harvey survey of the risk premium has a standard deviation of
1.28% over the period 2000 to 2011. Further, from regression (3) in Table 1 we see that
regressing the true risk premium onto the average belief about the risk premium yields a
slope coefficient of −1.41. This reflects the negative correlation between the belief about the
risk premium and the true risk premium and the fact that the true risk premium is more
volatile than the belief about the risk premium.
So what is the reason for the low volatility of the average belief and the negative corre-
lation between the average belief about the risk premium and the true risk premium in our
model? To understand this, recall that both the average belief about output growth and the
market view increase after positive shocks to output, implying that they are highly correlated
with an unconditional correlation coefficient of 0.989. Importantly, the average belief about
the risk premium depends positively on the average belief about output growth, but nega-
tively on the market view. The covariance between the average belief about the risk premium
and the true risk premium is cov(µˆSt − rt, µSt − rt) = var (µ¯t)− cov
(∫ t
−∞ νe
−ν(t−s)µˆs,tds, µ¯t
)
and, consequently, if the covariance between the average belief about output growth and the
market view is sufficiently high, the correlation between the average belief about the risk
premium and the true risk premium is negative. The unconditional standard deviation of
the average belief about output growth is 36 basis points while it is 35 basis points for the
market view, and given the high correlation between the two, the covariance is sufficiently
high to outweigh the variance of the market view. Further, the average belief about the
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risk premium is increasing in the average belief about output growth and decreasing in the
market view. Given that the two are almost perfectly correlated and have similar volatility,
the volatility of the average belief about the risk premium is low.
From the discussion above, we see that the key reason for the negative correlation between
the average belief about the risk premium and the true risk premium is that the average
belief about the output growth is highly correlated with the market view and more volatile.
The intuition for this result is that the actual risk premium is driven by the market view
and not the average belief about output growth. From the representative agent's point
of view (using the market view), the risk premium is in fact constant. In contrast, the
average belief puts too much weight on the young and inexperienced agents with low wealth.
Because young agents perceive a high risk premium after a series of positive shocks to the
stock market, the survey forecast reflects their view more heavily than what the market view
does and, therefore, correlates negatively with the true risk premium which is decreasing.
Remark 7. One might conjecture a negative relation between the true risk premium and the
average belief in a similar model with a representative agent with CRRA utility who learns
about consumption dynamics. This turns out to be difficult. For this case, the perceived risk
premium from the point of view of the representative agent is γσY , where γ is the coefficient
of relative risk aversion. This is the standard constant risk premium in a full information
model with CRRA utility. Hence, there is no variation in the risk premium from the point of
view of the representative agent. Therefore, even though under the true probability measure
it looks like as if there is predictability, one cannot generate a negative correlation between
the true and the perceived risk premium. The negative correlation between the true and the
average belief about the risk premium in our model is due to the large cross-sectional variation
in the aggressiveness of the updating of the beliefs and a market selection process that favors
the more experienced agents who update less aggressively.
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4 Conclusions
Empirical evidence suggests that experience matters for the formation of beliefs. If this
is the case, then we should ask how personal experiences with the stock market and the
macroeconomy in general manifest through savings and investment decisions and impact
asset prices more broadly.
In response, in this paper we develop a general equilibrium model with overlapping gen-
erations in which cohort specific experience drives beliefs about output growth and through
that affects equilibrium outcomes. We use the model to analyze how an experience based
bias impacts beliefs, consumption, portfolio choice, and ultimately drives asset prices.
We show that in equilibrium the wealth weighted average belief, which we call the market
view, is the relevant statistic for asset prices as the beliefs of wealthy agents influence prices
more than the beliefs of poor agents. This has important implications for how the risk
premium responds to shocks. After a positive shock, agents revise their belief about output
growth upwards. However, there is also an additional effect due to wealth reallocations
between agents with different beliefs as more optimistic agents gain from the shock and hence
their belief impact prices more. This second channel works as an amplification mechanism
and the risk premium becomes more volatile.
Our analysis offers a theoretical foundation for the empirical regularity that young indi-
viduals update expectations more strongly in the direction of recent surprises than old. In
equilibrium, the risk premium decreases after positive shocks. Yet, young agents increase
their risky investment at times when the risk premium is low, leading to a slower wealth
accumulation in the early years of life. Our model is sufficiently rich to accommodate an
endogenous life-cycle of expectations about the risk premium ranging from return extrapola-
tion when young to contrarian when old and a cross-section of beliefs that is consistent with
findings from survey evidence such as the return extrapolation of the average investor and
the negative correlation between the consensus forecast and future stock market returns.
Why are the consensus forecast and future stock market returns negatively correlated?
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After a positive shock, the stock market is priced as if the expected dividend growth is
higher than prior to the shock. From the point of view of an econometrician with full
information the stock looks expensive, i.e., the risk premium is lower than before the
shock. In contrast, the average belief puts too much weight on young agents who update
aggressively in the direction of the shock relative to the market view. Therefore, from the
standpoint of the average investor, the risk premium goes up rather than down, creating a
negative correlation between the true risk premium and the average belief about the risk
premium. The mechanism above highlights the importance of considering the whole cross-
section of beliefs to understand apparent puzzling features of the average beliefs, such as the
negative correlation with statistical measures of risk premia.
A The Dynamics of the Disagreement Process, ηs,t
Following Basak (2000), we derive the disagreement process, ηs,t, from the stochastic discount
factor under the objective probability measure over the stochastic discount factor under the
subjective probability measure, ηs,t =
ξt
ξs,t
. Formally, this is the dynamics of the Radon-
Nikodyn derivative. Solving the two stochastic differential equations in Equation (8) yields
ξt = ξse
− ∫ ts (ru+ 12 θ2u)du−∫ ts θudzu , ξs,t = ξs,se− ∫ ts (ru+ 12 θ2s,u)du−∫ ts θs,udzs,u . (43)
Their ratio is
ηs,t
ηs,s
=
ξt/ξs
ξs,t/ξs,s
= e−
1
2
∫ t
s (θ2u−θ2s,u)du−
∫ t
s θudzu+
∫ t
s θs,udzs,u . (44)
Using the equalities dzs,t = dzt −∆s,tdt and θs,t = θt + ∆s,t and rearranging terms leads to
ηs,t
ηs,s
= e−
1
2
∫ t
s ∆
2
s,u+
∫ t
s ∆s,udzu . (45)
Lastly, an application of Ito's lemma yields the dynamics of the disagreement process
dηs,t/ηs,t = ∆s,tdzt, (46)
where the disagreement process is a local martingale.
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B Proofs of Propositions
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Following standard filtering theory, i.e., Liptser and Shiryaev (1974a,b), the dynamics of the
expected output growth as perceived by an agent born at time s is given by Equation (2).
Defining the standardized estimation error at time t for an agent born at time s as
∆s,t =
µˆs,t − µY
σY
, (47)
and applying Ito's lemma yields
d∆s,t = − Vˆ
σ2Y + Vˆ (t− s)
∆s,tdt+
Vˆ
σ2Y + Vˆ (t− s)
dzt. (48)
The solution to this stochastic differential equation yields the desired result:
∆s,t =
σ2Y
σ2Y + Vˆ (t− s)
∆s,s +
Vˆ
σ2Y + Vˆ (t− s)
(zt − zs) . (49)
By the strong law of large numbers, we have limt−s→∞ zt−zst−s = 0 and, hence, limt−s→∞∆s,t = 0
a.s.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
An agent born at time s solves the static optimization problem in Equation (16). Rearranging
Equation (18) leads to the optimal consumption at time t under the probability measure of
an agent born at time s
cs,t = cs,se
−ρ(t−s)
(
ξs,s
ξs,t
)
. (50)
Inserting the relation between the perceived and the true stochastic discount factor in Equa-
tion (45) yields the result.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 presents the equilibrium expression for the stochastic discount factor. Let βt
define the fraction of aggregate output consumed by newborn agents:
βt =
ct,t
Yt
. (51)
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We conjecture, and verify later, that βt is constant, i.e., βt = β. Plugging in the optimal
consumption at time t of an agent born at time s, Equation (19), into the market clearing
condition for the goods market, Equation (13), we have the following:
Yt =
∫ t
−∞
νe−(ρ+ν)(t−s)cs,s
ξs
ξt
ηs,t
ηs,s
ds
Ytξt =
∫ t
−∞
νe−(ρ+ν)(t−s)
cs,s
Ys
Ysξs
ηs,t
ηs,s
ds
e(ρ+ν(1−β))tYtξt =
∫ t
−∞
βνe−βν(t−s)e(ρ+ν(1−β))sYsξs
ηs,t
ηs,s
ds
η¯t =
∫ t
−∞
βνe−βν(t−s)η¯s
ηs,t
ηs,s
ds, (52)
where η¯t = e
(ρ+ν(1−β))tYtξt. Applying Ito's lemma to η¯t, we obtain
dη¯t =
(
−βν
∫ t
−∞
βνe−βν(t−s)η¯s
ηs,t
ηs,s
ds+ βνη¯t
)
dt+ ∆¯tη¯tdzt
= ∆¯tη¯tdzt (53)
where
∆¯t =
∫ t
−∞
fs,t∆s,tds = E (∆t) , (54)
and where
fs,t = βνe
−(ρ+ν)(t−s)
(
η¯s
η¯t
)(
ηs,t
ηs,s
)
= νe−ν(t−s)
cs,t
Yt
, (55)
which represents the share of aggregate output at time t that accrues to agents born at time
s as in Equation (26).
Equation (53) corresponds to Equation (25) in Proposition 3. Using the fact that η¯t =
e(ρ+ν(1−β))tYtξt and solving for ξt, we get the stochastic discount factor in Equation (23) of
Proposition 3.
Lastly, the remainder of the proof verifies our conjecture about β. Using the result in
Equation (20), we rewrite β as follows
β =
ct,t
Yt
=
(ρ+ ν)Wˆt,t
Yt
=
(ρ+ ν)Ht,t
Yt
, (56)
where the last equality follows from the fact that an agent is born without financial wealth.
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Next, we solve for the value of the aggregate endowment of earnings
Ht,t =
1
ξt
Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−ν(u−t)ξuωYudu
]
= ωYtEt
[∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+ν+ν(1−β))(u−t)
η¯u
η¯t
du
]
=
ωYt
ρ+ ν + ν(1− β) , (57)
where, in the second line, we plug in the equilibrium stochastic discount factor, Equation
(23), and in the third line, we use the martingale property of η¯t and solve the integral.
Combining Equation (56) and (57), we get
β =
(ρ+ ν)ω
ρ+ ν + ν(1− β) . (58)
Solving the quadratic equation for β gives two solutions
β+ =
ρ+ 2ν
2ν
+
√
ρ2 + 4(ρ+ ν)ν(1− ω)
2ν
, β− =
ρ+ 2ν
2ν
−
√
ρ2 + 4(ρ+ ν)ν(1− ω)
2ν
. (59)
Next, we show that only the second solution, β−, is feasible. As we demonstrate below, the
expression for the equilibrium stock market price, St, is
St =
1− ω
ρ+ ν(1− β)Yt, (60)
for ρ+ν(1−β) > 0. This provides an upper bound on the values that β can take, specifically
β < ρ+ν
ν
. For ρ > 0, we have that β+ = ρ+2ν
2ν
+
√
ρ2+4(ρ+ν)ν(1−ω)
2ν
> ρ+2ν
2ν
+
√
ρ2
2ν
= ρ+ν
ν
and
hence β+ is not a feasible solution. For β−, we have that β− = ρ+2ν
2ν
−
√
ρ2+4(ρ+ν)ν(1−ω)
2ν
<
ρ+2ν
2ν
−
√
ρ2
2ν
= 1 and, therefore, ρ+ ν(1− β) > 0 when ρ > 0.
Finally, using Equation (22), (57), and (60) we have that Ht =
∫ t
−∞ νe
−ν(t−s)Hs,tds = βWˆt
and (1− β) Wˆt.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Applying Ito's lemma to Equation (23) gives
dξt = d
(
η¯t
e−(ρ+ν(1−β))t
Yt
)
=
(
η¯t
e−(ρ+ν(1−β))t
Yt
)
[
(−ρ− ν(1− β)− µY + σ2Y − σY ∆¯t) dt− (σY − ∆¯t) dzt].(61)
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Taking the dynamics of the stochastic discount factor, Equation (8), and the dynamics of
Equation (61), matching the drift and diffusion terms leads to the following equilibrium
expressions for the real short rate and market price of risk, respectively
rt = ρ+ µY + ν(1− β)− σ2Y + σY ∆¯t (62)
and
θt = σY − ∆¯t. (63)
To obtain the equilibrium real short rate and market price of risk as in Equations (28) and
(29), it suffices to substitute the definition ∆¯t =
µ¯t−µY
σY
in the equations above.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Discounting the dividends, Dt, with the stochastic discount factor yields
St =
1
ξt
Et
[∫ ∞
t
ξuDudu
]
=
1− ω
ξt
Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+ν(1−β))uη¯udu
]
=
1− ω
ξt
η¯t
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+ν(1−β))udu =
1− ω
ρ+ ν(1− β)Yt. (64)
Applying Ito's lemma to the equilibrium stock price leads to
dSt
St
=
dYt
Yt
. (65)
Using Equation (7) and Equation (1) to match drift and diffusion terms yields the equilibrium
expected return
µSt = ρ+ µY + ν(1− β), (66)
and the stock market volatility
σSt = σY . (67)
Equation (67) is the stock market volatility as in Proposition 5. Subtracting the equilibrium
real short rate from the expected return on the stock market, Equation (66), yields the risk
premium on the stock market, Equation (32), as in Proposition 5.
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B.6 Proof of Proposition 6
The total wealth at time t of an agent born at time s under the objective probability measure
follows from the static budget constraint
Wˆs,t =
1
ξt
Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−ν(u−t)ξucs,udu
]
=
cs,t
ρ+ ν
. (68)
Substituting in optimal consumption, Equation (19), and rearranging terms, we have
ξt (Ws,t +Hs,t) = cs,se
−ρ(t−s) ηs,t
ηs,s
ξs
ρ+ ν
. (69)
Applying Ito's lemma to both sides of Equation (69), using Equation (12) and (57) and
equating the diffusion terms, we get
ξt
(
pis,tσ
S
t +Hs,tσY − Wˆs,tθt
)
= ∆s,tcs,se
−ρ(t−s) ηs,t
ηs,s
ξs
ρ+ ν
. (70)
Using Equation (20) and simplifying yields
pis,tσ
Y = Wˆs,t
(
σY − ∆¯t + ∆s,t
)−Hs,tσY . (71)
Solving the above equation for the optimal portfolio, pis,t,
pis,t =
∆s,t − ∆¯t
σY
Wˆs,t +Ws,t, (72)
leads to Equation (6).
B.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Applying Ito's lemma to the market view, µ¯t =
∫ t
−∞ fs,tµˆs,tds, we get
dµ¯t = ft,tµˆt,tdt+
∫ t
−∞
fs,tdµˆs,tds+
∫ t
−∞
µˆs,tdfs,tds+
∫ t
−∞
dfs,tdµˆs,tds. (73)
Hence, we need the dynamics of the wealth shares and the individual agents' beliefs, µˆs,t. The
dynamics of the beliefs are given in Equation (4). Applying Ito's lemma to the expression
for the wealth share in Proposition (3), we find:
dfs,t
fs,t
=
(−βν + ∆¯2t − ∆¯t∆s,t) dt+ (∆s,t − ∆¯t) dzt. (74)
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Inserting Equation (4) and (74) into Equation (73) and after some algebra, we obtain the
dynamics of the market view
dµ¯t = βν (µˆt,t − µ¯t) dt− V¯t
σY
∆¯tdt+
V¯t
σY
dzt, (75)
where V¯t = E
(
Vˆt
)
+ V (µˆt). Hence, the diffusion coefficient is guaranteed to be positive if
both E
(
Vˆt
)
and V (µˆt) are positive. This is indeed the case as Vˆs,t is positive for all agents
and V (µˆt) is the variance (using the wealth distribution) of the beliefs which is positive.
B.8 Proof of Proposition 8
This follows directly from the expression for the real short rate, market price of risk, and
risk premium combined with the fact that ∂µ¯t
∂zt
> 0.
B.9 Proof of Proposition 9
First, note that given the specification of the prior belief and the pre-trading period of 20
years the belief at time t of an agent born at time s is
µˆs,t = µY + σY
zt − zs−20
t− (s− 20) . (76)
Next, we express the Brownian motion as a function of the return process and the expected
return:
dzt =
dRt − µSt dt
σSt
. (77)
Using the expression for µSt in Equation (66), the equilibrium stock market volatility in
Equation (67), the representation of the beliefs in Equation (76), and the expression for the
shocks in Equation (77) yield the result.
B.10 Proof of Proposition 10
Applying Ito's lemma to the log of the equilibrium consumption in, Equation (19), we get
dlog(cs,t) =
(
µY + ν(1− β)− 1
2
σ2Y +
1
2
(
∆¯2t −∆2s,t
))
dt+
(
σY + ∆s,t − ∆¯t
)
dzt. (78)
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